AVANT-GARDE: THE CONVULSIONS OF A CONCEPT MICHAEL T. JONES
The Ohio State University I An eerie calm hangs over the concept of the «avant-garde.» At a time when an «Avant-garde Hair Centre» (British spelling of be the latest addition to your neighborhood suburban shopping mall, the concept seems to survive in the general consciousness only as a distant, mocking echo of its original destructive impulse. At a time when some nonrepresentational art-Klee or Mondrian paintings-adorns calendars, that original impulse pitifully reappears in a shadowy form, only to be ridiculed by the relentless commodity mechanisms of late capitalism. Those mechanisms resemble a gigantic vacuum cleaner which sucks up everything within its imperious reach, only to dump it out again into the garbage can of consummatory obsolescence: a mixture of schlock, dirt, fuzz, and what used to pass for «art.» What Walter Benjamin once called the «eternal return of the New» is sneeringly confirmed by the pathetically easy devouring of any subversive phenomenon whatever, by the infinitely voracious appetite of commodification and consumption. Culture high, low, and indifferent has at its ready beck and call not «the burden of the past»-scholastic formulation-but rather its rich legacy of mimetic and non-mimetic, Aristotelian and Brechtian, tonal and atonal, formed and free-form possibilities for artistic creation, or at least for aesthetic convulsions. And who can penetrate the labyrinthine maze of influence, not upon artistic production (difficult enough in itself) but rather upon cultural marketing, which 27 1 will supposedly determine whether today's artists will feel like emulating Balzac or Joyce, Johann Strauss or John Cage, Monet or Munch or Pollock or Andy Warhol? Who knows just how decisive the marketplace really is in contemporary artistic endeavor; must the slogan about «art as commodity» remain unfalsifiable yet unverifiable leftist paranoia? Such questions threaten immediately to overwhelm our much more modest point of departure: the question of the current stature of the avant-garde. The frenetic pace of contemporary culture virtually precludes the possibility of genuine recurrence of «events» similar to those artistic phenomena of the early twentieth century now enshrined as the «avant-garde» or, in the terms of the most significant recent analysis, that of Peter Burger, the «historical» avant-garde. Such movements as Dada, Futurism, and most importantly Surrealism surely demonstrated their primal gesture of «epater le bourgeois;» but such a bourgeois audience for «high» culture as still remains has become accustomed to such mistreatment, having been insulted by Handke and harangued by assorted socialist Brecht epigones. They have subsidized (willingly or not) outrageously «up-to-date» renditions of virtually all the classics-from Shakespeare to Albee-that one could name. They have been subjected to the most questionable «works of art» in front of public buildings and-again, in shopping malls, the last remnant of a bourgeois public sphere, such as it is. (This habitual «epater» of course renders the National Endowment for the Arts a prime target for the new administration's budget cutters.) All these cultural phenomena and their creators frantically seek to fulfill (or perhaps even to create) authentic non-commodified needs, and this in an age when no need escapes commodification, not to speak of the status of created new ones.
Historical looks backward, hermeneutic theory has repeatedly assured and finally convinced us, are always impelled by a particular actuating force, a «cognition-guiding interest,» emanating from the present. In the case of Burger's prototypical effort, the historical caesura can be located quite precisely: the year 1968. For when Burger designates the intention of the historical avant-garde movements as follows: «Art should not simply be destroyed but rather transformed into life-praxis, where it would be preserved, even if in an altered form» (67), he does so from the perspective of that historical moment when it appeared that such an «aestheticiza-tion» of society might actually be possible. The moment that the 1914 (with a tragic «sublation» here). These generational upheavals mark rather clearly significant and lasting changes in cultural consciousness. Hereafter, those defenders of «classical» contemporary high culture, apologists of Joyce and Kandinsky, advocates of the lasting accomplishments of modern art against the atrocities of the cultural upstarts, would be pressed into a defensive posture. Normative notions of genuine artistic creation become increasingly less convincing; they are continually being overtaken, not so much by newer art as by newer political events. To the Dutschke and CohnBendit-led European students, the most recent heirs of this continuing cultural dialectic, the «classical» avant-garde was as distant as that «Great War» which played so large a role in it. It is a grim irony of this century that the cataclysmic triumph of technological warfare, the clear victory of the «rational» in the service of the overwhelmingly irrational, should have been so soon forgotten, repressed, one is tempted to assert, or at the very least overtaken by the rush of later political events. For the 1968 generation, the children of that generation which spent its childhood in the Hitler Youth, the mud of Flanders and the flame-throwers of Verdun were as remote as the Dada and Expressionist poets.
Thus the avant-garde was consigned to the junk heap of cultural memory along with the classics, although at least they were not (like the classics of Weimar) enlisted for the propagation of apolitical humanism in the school system. Thus the classical avantgarde in Europe became the special domain of the guardians of high culture. In Hermand's usually witty formulation: «The highbrows raved about Joyce, Kandinsky, and Schonberg, while the 'people' satisfied its cultural needs with pop hits, comics, and pulp novels. And then suddenly around 1960, up popped a few tarbarians'...»3 American «pop» art may entail ideological slipperyness (affirmative or critical of the world of Campbell's soup cans, Brillo soap pad boxes, Marilyn Monroe countenances?), but it was certainly at the very least a frontal attack on the «highbrows» and their institutions devoted to the pious worship of canonized modernity. In many respects, European developments during the decade were only pale reflections of the American effort to free art from its museums and concert halls. Viewed in this light, the events of 1968 were a logical conclusion to the decade's own dynamics, regardless of the immediate historical provocation of the Vietnam War. From the love-and-peace messages of the flower children to the outrageously sexual and blasphemous outpourings of shockerpop theatricality, art was to become life. Hermand's insightful analysis of these events allows only the conclusion that these excesses were carried to the greatest imaginable extremes. Indeed they were forced to by the logic of what Hermand calls «Modcom» (for Commercial Exploitation of Modernity'): «Yet because the threshold of sensibility steadily increases and consequently the sensations become ever 'bloodier,' the political provocateurs accelerate their shock effects into the realm of the madly gruesome and obscene, in order to attract any customers at all. In this manner, they end up with a kind of shocker-pop-commerce or horrorcommerce, which can scarcely be distinguished from the popular entertainment industry.» 5 That is indeed the deadly dialectic, fatal to any effort to aestheticize life itself.
In Europe, such trends were more directly political in a traditional sense, but they nevertheless had their aesthetic overtones and predecessors. Karl Heinz Bohrer describes an anarchistic pamphlet distributed in 1967 at the Free University of Berlin, which called for bombing your local department store. «Surrealist cynicism terrorizes the nerves of morally aware people. The technique of satire is turned that one degree further, so that it can engender a feeling of utmost gravity. But that is precisely the literary and political attribute which was most obvious in the earliest tracts and provocations of the classical surrealists.»' 1968 When one has read enough of such essays, an impression of circling scholasticism or infinite Talmudic twisting can sometimes set in. For our present purposes, the various ins and outs of the discussion are of less significance than the fact of the theoretical discussion itself: if the post-avant-garde (we shall use the term «post-modern» synonymously) does exist, it is as much in theory as in fact. That is not only the recurrent burden of German intellectual life, although one's stereotypical conception of much German literary criticism as being heavy on the theory and somewhat stingier with concrete analyses of works of art will not be contradicted by the volumes under discussion. (In this regard, the Germans may be pace-setters for the rest of us!) No, the retrenchment of hopeful street Surrealism into theory is rather one example of a more general current: the proliferation of theory.
This proliferation can be viewed in several ways. In the specifically German context, the apparently dominant literary trend toward the «New Inwardness» reflects both disappointment at the failure of the spontaneous movement and the recognition that a great deal of socio-political engagement during those heady times was the direct projection of personal neuroses. The same can be said for much of the theory then produced (quantitatively much more than later in the 1970s). It aimed at immediate street-level realization, tirelessly evoking post-bourgeois public spheres where none existed. But theory now proliferates also in France, England, and America, each emerging out of different cultural contexts and for divergent reasons, but nevertheless with similar superficial results.
This multiplication of theoretical discourse-whether structuralist or post-structuralist, marxist or deconstructionist-invokes a multiplicity of codes and consequently often engenders gross The atomized present, however, presents different problems for the theorist. There is the situation of philosophical aesthetics itself, which is for all practical purposes the philosophy of Adorno. For it was here that the manifold development of modern art since Baudelaire-from aestheticism and l'art pour l'art through the historical avant-garde to modernity's apparent extreme, Beckett, receives its historical-philosophical foundation as the necessary manifestation of late monopoly capitalism and its consequences for the individual. This art offers an accurately discordant account of the fragmented state of what remains of bourgeois individuality under such corporate, consummatory, and cultural conditions. The work of art can no longer be measured by older criteria of organic unity as in classicism or even bourgeois realism. Yet Burger also accurately perceives the dangers of this trenchant philosophical analysis of modernity: «It seems at first as if Adorno had thereby broken through definitively all normative theory. Yet it is not difficult to recognize how the normative once again gains entry even in the course of radical historicization» (120). And if this rather exclusive view of authentic modernity tends toward the normative, how is one to confront those lesser lights who may themselves abjure classical wholeness? But even more to the point: what now?
Reinhard Baumgart has entitled an essay «What Comes After Modern Literature?» He writes: «Before our eyes, this entire modernism, from Baudelaire to Pound, from Henry James to Beckett, from Strindberg to Brecht, is beginning to sink back into tradition, to become classical.»'2 In his view, «classical» means historical, available in museums, no longer exemplary for contemporary work. With justification, he feels drawn to Thomas Mann's late refrain: «It seems to me that nothing more will come.» The essayist has no answer for his own question; his somewhat impres-sionistic discussion of three novels which happened to appear during the epochal year 1968 can achieve no synthesis. There is no need to name the selected works here; the critic admits that they could readily be replaced by others. Indeed, that is part of the point: they incorporate a kind of «throwaway» use value. Various characteristics are noted: «They take leave of the bourgeoisie as subject, narrate from the edge of society and toward utopia, and depart at the same time from bourgeois realism as a method of writing.» «The narrative is in all three novels disconnected, cut quickly like film, diverted, without any continuity, permeated by montages consisting of mere fabricated parts, hackneyed slogans, newspaper articles, parodies.» This literature «obviously no longer wants to pretend to be critique or cognition, their fictions want by no means to imitate realities.»" The aura of the exemplary event even of great avant-garde works is now absent, replaced by immediate use in a receptive context of «diversion.» Yet simultaneously, although Baumgart does not mention it here, noteworthy works are still being produced which could be seen as bourgeois realism, which offer a continuous narrative (even if it can sometimes only be recovered with considerable effort), which purport to contain cognition and critique. Does the critic intend to imply that the works he chooses are the genuine «post-modern» works while these latter ones are not? And if so, would that not claim for a particular version of «post-modernism» the identically normative status that already seemed problematic in Adorno's conception of modernity?
And Nevertheless, Habermas' conclusion must give pause. His prime concern is clearly to combat those neoconservatives, who «greet the development of modern science, insofar as it goes beyond its own sphere only in order to promote technical progress, capitalist growth, and rational administration. Otherwise, they recommend a policy of defusion of the explosive content of cultural modernism.» The question is one of retaining this explosive content; but one wonders whether the final evocation of the mentor for whom the prize was named is the most felicitous means for rescuing the gesture of refusal and critique. If Adorno's conception of modernism was narrow and tended to become normative,a postmodern critique that rejects such normativism need not also reject these subversive content. Philosophical aesthetics cannot fall back even upon its most «progressive» historical position. Adorno himself reflected on the «obsolete» nature of his enterprise in the Aesthetic Theory.
So no immediately synthesizing facet is available. After the most recent hopes for a transcendence of art into life were dashed, such hopes seem only utopian in the negative sense of obscurantist. The limits of the exploitation of nature («enough could be produced for all, if one could only alter the structures of domination»)-that dynamic thesis of Frankfurt thought, seems relativized by the recent experience of scarcity, although one could imagine that if production for profit were halted and production for genuine (not created) needs instituted, scarcity might well become more scarce. So much for the economic sphere, which, confused as it is, seems virtually transparent in comparison to the cultural. If the total availability of all forms and aesthetic strategies-as Burger contends-is indeed an accurate account of the current situation, then it is difficult to formulate general statements about it.
A theory of the post-avant-garde must above all-this is Habermas' prime concern-beware of applause from the wrong side. It must continue to insist on the ongoing emancipatory potential of that classical avant-garde which it is simultaneously attempting to-continue? overcome? For it must never forget that the avant-garde directed its attack chiefly at art itself, but with the goal of art's sublation, not its destruction. The profusion of theory-in the guise of mutually incomprehensible theories-can only constitute a transitory repose. The true enemy, neoconservatism, must not derive comfort from a theory of post-modernism so narrow that it eventually eliminates any possible critique or subversion that does not measure up to preconceived aesthetic standards. But that means that the colorful chaos of current artistic production continues to elude conceptual synthesis. That dialectic of concept and chaos defines our situation; but when was it not so? NOTES
